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In The Language of Thought, Fodor claims that 
A typical thesis of positivistic philosophy of 
science is that all true theories in the special 
sciences should reduce to physical theories 'in 
the long run*.1 
For those who ascribe to such a "unity of science 
thesis", the correlate to this claim in the philosophy 
of language is that any sentence in a non-extenuional 
language is translatable (without loss of meaning) into 
a sentence in some extensional language.2 While such a 
reductionist thesis may appear guite radical (indeed, 
let us refer to it as "radical" extensionalism3), a 
lot depends upon what is to count as an extensional 
language. Following the insights of Carnap's Meaning 
and Necessity,4 one means of defining an extensTonäl 
language (or, in Carnap's words, an extensional system) 
is to say that a language is extensional just in case 
all of its sentences are extensional. With regards to 
the definition of an extensional sentence, Carnap 
claims that a sentence is extensional just in case the 
replacement of any designative component5 of that sen-
tence by some other appropriately related (e.g., co-
referential) designative component leaves the truth-
value of the sentence unchanged. Accepting this as an 
account of what an extensional language is, it follows 
that the rationale of one's ascribing to any sort or 
reductionist thesis (for the philosophy of language) 
turns on the rationale for claiming that there is some 
relation such that the substitution of appropriately 
related designative components does not alter the truth 
value of the sentence in which the substitution takes 
place. For Carnap this is complicated by the re-
cognition of (at least) four types of designators: (de-
clarative) sentences, predicators, functors, and sing-
ular terms. Carnap's complexities aside, the as-
sumption of this paper is that the function of singular 
terms in extensional sentences is paradigmatic of the 
function of other types of designators. Hence, if one 
can understand both (i) what the adoption of radical 
extensionalism in the case of singular terms amounts to 
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and (ii) what the "obligation" is that some feel con-
cerning the adoption of radical extensionalism for 
singular terms, then one will understand the motivation 
for claiming that radical extensionalism is applicable 
in the case of other types of designators. Accord-
ingly, the first thing to do is to formulate an unprob-
lematic version of radical extensionalism as it applies 
to singular terms. To this end the paper adopts the 
lead of Michael Dummett (and Frege, depending upon how 
accurate Dummett's interpretation of Frege is on this 
point) and offers the following "Dummett-like" formula-
tion: 
(ET) If both ran and rb*1 6 are singular terms and 
F( ) is any predicate, then from the truth of 
both ra is equivalent to b"1 and rF(a)~\ the 
sentence rF(b) n is logically entailed.7 
Although seemingly innocuous, there is an important 
sense in which (ET) is doubly ambiguous. First, (ET) 
does not itself provide an explanation of what it means 
to be a singular term, and second, (ET) does not spe-
cify the nature of the equivalence relation connecting 
•"a"1 and rb~l. With regards to the first matter, more 
will be said later. At present an intuitive under-
standing of what it means to be a singular term will 
suffice. That is to say, let us suppose that by 'sing-
ular term' we mean names, pronouns, definite descrip-
tions, etc.8 The second matter, however, needs immedi-
ate attention. Without any definite specification, the 
relation, denoted by the phrase 'is equivalent to 1, 
which binds r a 1 and r b 1 , could be any relation satis-
fying the requirements of reflexivity, symmetry, and 
transitivity. For instance, we surely do not want this 
relation (call it 'R') to be r...has the same ortho-
graphic structure as..."1, and yet this relation is an 
equivalence relation. As Ruth Marcus has pointed out,9 
the problem is that there is no relation which intui-
tively presents itself as the sole viable candidate for 
R. Instead, there seem to be a number of relations 
which, prima facie, could sanction the entailment 
demanded by (ET). What distinguishes these relations 
from one another is not the ability to sanction the en-
tailment in (ET), rather the distinction rests with the 
variation in the constraints they impose on what set of 
sentences are entailed. Since radical extensionalism 
claims that all sentences in a language are extensional 
(or translatable into an extensional sentence), then 
the specification of R must be such that given the 
truth of rF(a)"1 and raRb*T, the truth of any rF(b) n nec-
essarily follows. 
Classically, the most common specification of R 
would seem to be: 
(ER) r...has the same denotation as...n 
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Thus, let us for the moment suppose that the relation, 
R, in (ET) is (ER). If, in addition, we suppose that 
Ehe above adequately captures the thesis of radical ex-
tensionalism as it applies to singular terms and that 
'Eg.' is to be used in what follows for (ER), then the 
following represents an acceptable proof schema: 
p 1. 'A' Eq. 'B' 
p 2. F(A) 
Hence 3. F(B) by (ET) 
Indeed, this proof schema does seem to hold for such 
simple instances as: 
p 1.« 'John1 Eq. 'the butler' 
p 2.' John is tall. 
Hence 3.' The butler is tall. by (ET) 
But consider the following instance of the proof 
schema: 
p 1." 'John' Eq. 'the butler' 
p 2." Frank believes that John is rich. 
Hence 3." Frank believes that the butler is rich, by 
(ET) 
Russell referred to the failure of 3." to follow from 
1." and 2." as the problem of propositional atti-
tudes. 1 0 The problem is that while it might very well 
be true that 'John' and 'the butler' have the same 
denotation and that Frank believes that John is rich, 
(and so both 1." and 2." be true), Frank might nonethe-
less fail to believe (perhaps because the butler leads 
a double life that is unknown to Frank) that the butler 
is rich (and so 3." be false). However, if it is poss-
ible that both 1." and 2." are true and 3." false, then 
the truth of 3." does not follow from the truth of 1." 
and 2." Yet in as much as 1.", 2.", and 3." are in-
stances of 1,2 and 3 respectively, then according to 
(ET) if 1." and 2." are both true, then 3." must also 
be true. Clearly, something has to be given up. The 
question, of course, is "what should we give up?". 
Reflection suggests that there are two distinct alter-
natives. 
First, one could claim that it is false that both 
1." and 2." could be true and 3." false. On the face 
of it, however, this sort of claim requires us to dist-
inguish (at least) two sorts of belief. Specifically, 
we are led to say that while it may be true that it is 
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false that Frank (actively) "entertains" the belief 
that the butler is rich, this is not what 3." is about. 
Rather, 3." is making the weaker claim that Frank "has" 
the belief that the butler is rich. 1 1 The point is 
that while all of us (presumably) "have" the belief 
that cows do not play chess, it is also probably true 
that very few of us "entertain" the belief unless they 
need it as a philosophical example. Thus, in the case 
of Frank and his beliefs, while: 
3a" Frank entertains the belief that the butler is 
rich. 
does not follow from (in conjunction with the truth of 
1.") either Frank having the belief that John is rich 
or Frank entertaining the belief that John is rich, 
3b" Frank has the belief that the butler is rich. 
does follow from (in conjunction with the truth of 1.") 
either Frank having the belief that John is rich or 
Frank entertaining the belief that John is rich. 
Although this distinction seems efficacious in the case 
of Frank and his beliefs, it is not, in itself, suffi-
cient to resolve the problem with all propositional at-
titude contexts. To see this, imagine the following: 
1."' Set theory is equivalent to set theory plus 
the Banach-Tarski theorem.12 
2."' Frank believes that set theory is true. 
3."' Frank believes that set theory plus Banach-
Tarski is true. 
From the examination of 3a" above, it seems unprob-
lematic that: 
3a"' Frank entertains the belief that set theory 
plus Banach-Tarski is true. 
does not follow from (in conjunction with the truth of 1."') either 
2a"' Frank has the belief that set theory is true, 
or 
2b"1 Frank entertains the belief that set theory is 
true. 
Moreover, it seems clear that, because of the extremely 
counter-intuitive nature of the Banach-Tarski theorem, 
not only does 3a1" not follow from either 2a 1" or 2b , M , 
but that 
265 
3b , M Frank has the belief that set theory plus 
Banach-Tarski is true. 
does not follow from (in conjunction with the truth of 
1."') either 2a"' or 2b"'. After all, it seems odd to 
say that someone has a belief that a proposition (or 
set of propositions) is true while (staunchly) refusing 
to assent to its truth. According to Field, however, 
this is precisely what happens for nearly everyone (not 
knowing Banach-Tarski to be a theorem) for whom the 
theorem is formulated. Hence, it seems that while 3b" 
does follow from the truth 1." and 2.", it is not, in 
general, true that the truth of rA believes (has the 
belief) that p n follows from the truth of both ra Eq. 
b"1 and rA believes (has or entertains the belief) that 
q~>, where ""p^ is the same as '*q"» except for the replace-
ment of occurances of r a 1 in r<p by r b 1 in r p ' . Per-
haps another "type" of belief could be found which 
would rescue us from the case of 3."'; if so, I do not 
see it. 
Now the presumption of the above was that by dis-
covering a way to "fix up" 2." in an appropriate manner 
the problems that propositional attitude contexts 
created for (ET) could be solved. However, with the 
apparant failure of this attempted fix and no other in-
tuitive resolutions to the problem available (to me, at 
any rate), it seems as if a re-examination ol (ER), 
with respect to the specification of R, is in order. 
In other words, rather than attempting to delineate 
finer and finer shades of belief, R can be respecified 
as a relation stronger than identity of denotation. 
Such a move is, in effect, tantamount to claiming that 
the contradiction (ET) seemingly gives rise to is due 
to an improper specification of the equivalence rela-
tion that relates the two singular tetms. Indeed, if 
the scope of (ET) is universal, then the failure of the 
first attempt at a fix together with the lack of any 
intuitive means of delineating finer shades of beliefs 
seems to naturally lead to the attempt to specify R. 
Now, as lias already been noted, there are a number 
of possible (re)specifications of R. Indeed, for any-
one familiar with the (more philosophical) writings of 
Frege, the failure of (ER) should not have been wholly 
unexpected. It is a problem Frege recognized and at-
tempted to meet in "On Sense and Meaning".'3 In this 
work Frege claims that in order to account for a 
posteriori identities one must refer not only to a sin-gular term's referent, but to its sense as well. To 
use Frege's own example, the identification of the ref-
erent of 'the morning star' with the referent of 'the 
evening star' is informative precisely because there is 
a sense to 'the morning star' which differs from the 
sense of 'the evening star'. In contrast, in an a 
priori identity such as 'the morning star is the morn-
ing star', both the sense and the reference of the 
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referring expressions are the same. In as much as i-
dentity is, in Frege's account, a function of both 
sense and reference, it follows that to claim that ra 
is equivalent to b"1 is true just in case ra~* and rb~' 
both denote the same object and have the same sense is 
stronger than the claim made by (ER). Indeed, as 
Holland notes, identity of sense (and so too, refer-
ence) is so strong that it is a sufficient condition 
"to license substitution in indirect speech;"14 Hence, 
we can strengthen (ER) by the following respecifica-
tion: 
(ER)' r. ..has the same sense as..."1 
Moreover, because, according to Frege, the function of 
a sign's sense is to identify (pick out) that sign's 
reference (if it has one), (ER)' can be reworded as: 
(ER)" '...identifies its referent in the same way 
as.. P 
If (ER)" seems intuitively inadequate as a spec-
ification of R, it is because of the ambiguity attached 
to the relation of identification utilized in (ER)". 
While the relation of denoting seems to be clearly de-
fined, the relation of identification does not. , s For 
instance, do 'unmarried male1 and 'bachelor' have the 
same sense?; i.e., does 'unmarried male' identify its 
referent (a class I take it) in the same way as 
'bachelor'? The answer to this question, for Frege at 
least, seems to rest with Dummett's observation that: 
The sense of an expression is...that part of its 
meaning which is relevant to the determination of 
the truth-value of sentences in which the expres-
sion occurs.16 
In other words, any two expressions, for example 'un-
married male1 and 'bachelor', have the same sense 
(i.e., identify their referents in the same way) only 
if the first expression may uniformly replace every oc-
curance of the second expression in every sentence of 
the language in which the second expression occurs 
without altering the truth-value of that sentence, and 
visa versa. If Dummett is correct in his interpreta-
tion of Frege (and I am correct in my interpretation of 
Dummett), then (ER)" not only characterizes Frege's 
views on identity but also Mates' definition of syn-
onymy . 1 7 In this case (ER)" can be rewritten as: 
(ER)",r...is synonymous (in a Language L) with..."1 
The effect of adopting (ER)"' is, in the case of 
1." - 3.", to make 1." false. That is, while it may be 
true that 'John' and 'the Butler' both have the same 
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referent, it is pretty clearly not true that 'John' is 
synonymous with 'the butler' (in English, at any rate). 
If 1." is false, however, then it is no longer neces-
sary that 3." be true. As far as it goes, this is pre-
cisely what we wanted. The contradiction which seemed 
to follow from adopting (ER) is avoided. Notice, how-
ever, that if the adoption of (ER)"' means that 1." is 
no longer true, then it follows that 1.' is no longer 
true either. Hence, not only is it is no longer neces-
sary that 3." be true, it is also not necessary that 
3.' be true. What this suggests, I think, is that 
while (ER)'" does (apparently) solve the problem of 
propositional attitudes, the price of the solution (for 
English, at any rate) may well be too high. It appears 
as if the specification of R in (ER)"' is so strong 
that no two (orthographically) different singular terms 
are synonymous; at least this seems to be the moral of 
the set theory plus Banach-Tarski example. Not only is 
this counter intuitive, but, more importantly, it sug-
gests an even deeper problem with (ER)"'. The adoption 
of (ER) 1" as a specification of R means that the truth 
or falsity of the sentence ra Is equivalent, to b n de-
pends on the purely syntactical matter of whether 
rF(b)"1 is or is not (respectively) entailed by rF(a)^ 
for any predicate F in the language. Recall, however, 
that the function of specifying the equivalence condi-
tion in a particular way was to both justify and place 
some constraint on the entailmenFTTF rF(b)"1 from rF(a) n 
for any predicate F in the language. In other words, 
while (ET) says that one can derive rF(b)' if and only 
if both rF(a)~l and ra is equivalent to b"1 are true, 
(ER) 1", the specification of the equivalence relation 
binding r a M and rb~ l together, says that ra is equiva-
lent to b"1 if and only if rF(b) n is entailed by rF(a)"1 
for all predicates F in the (object) language. The 
problem, of course, is that on this account, (ET) is 
attempting to set conditions on rF(b)",'s being entailed 
by rF(a)' and ra is equivalent to b~)only by presuppos-
ing that the equivalence of ra"1 and 'b^ is a function 
of rF(b)"1 's being entailed by rF(a) 1. Given this, it 
seems clear that (ER)'" could not be a correct specifi-
cation of R. 
There are, of course, different ways of trying to 
fix-up (ER) that do not (obviously) involve the circu-
larity of (ER)'". One way, suggested (though later re-
jected) by Mates 1 8 in analyzing the notion of synonymy, 
is to weaken the constraint on synonymy to something 
like Carnap's intensional isomorphism. In this case 
(ER) becomes: 
(ER)"" r...is intensionally isomorphic lo...^ 
According to Mates, the problem with (ER)"" is there 
are counter-examples to the weakened constraint which 
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undercut its use as a solution to the propositional at-
titude problem. Mates' remarks: 
...let "D" and "D"' be abbreviations for two in-
tensionally isomorphic sentences. Then [because 
"D" and "D"' are intensionally isomorphic] the 
following sentences are also intensionally iso-
morphic: 
(14) Whoever believes that D believes that D. 
(15) Whoever believes that D believes that 
D'. 
But nobody doubts that whoever believes that D 
believes that D. Therefore, nobody doubts that 
whoever believes that D believes that D'. This 
seems to suggest that, for any pair of in-
tensionally isomorphic sentences—let them be ab-
breviated by "D" and "D"',—if anyone even doubts 
that whoever believes that D believes that D', 
then Carnap's explication is incorrect.19 
Mates' criticism can be illustrated by considering one 
of Carnap's own examples. In Meaning and Necessity Car-
nap claims that the expressions, rS>3t and 'Gr(v,III)' 
are intensionally isomorphic. In this case, though, it 
follows that "whoever believes that 5>3 believes that 
5>3" is intensionally isomorphic to "Whoever believes 
that 5>3 believes that Gr(v,III)". However, it is easy 
to imagine someone (say a 1st or 2nd grader) who does 
not doubt that "Whoever believes that 5>3 believes that 
5>3" but does doubt (perhaps because they think that 
for the Romans 5 was not greater than 3) that "Whoever 
believes that 5>3 believes that Gr(v,III)". It follows 
that the truth value of "Whoever believes that 5>3 be-
lieves that 5>3" may be different than that of "Whoever 
believes that 5>3 believes that Gr(v,III)". Hence, the 
two sentences cannot be intensionally isomorphic. If 
this counter-example is sound, then it is clear that 
intensional isomorphisim is not strong enough as a 
specification for (ER). Of course one may claim that 
•5>3' is not intensionally isomorphic to 'Gr(v,III)', 
but if they are not then it is difficult to see what 
would count as a genuine instance of intensional iso-
morphism. Surely, in other words, '5>3' and 
'Gr(v,III)' are L-eguivalent since '(5>3) = 
(Gr(v,lII))' is L-true in English. In fact, the exam-
ple using '5>3' and 'Gr(V,III)' seems to meet the even 
more rigorous standard Putnam proposed in 1954 2 0 as a 
modification of Carnap's intensional isomorphism.21 
Now while the above counterexample used (for the sake 
of simplicity) the sentences '5>3' and 'Gr(v,III)', it 
can be reproduced at the level of singular terms since, 
for Carnap, the concepts of L-eguivalence and in-
tensional isomorphism also apply to singular terms. 
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Hence, it follows that (ER)"" is inadequate as a spe-
cification of R. 
Not surprisingly, Putnam is not alone in thinking 
that Mates' criticisms of (ER)"" can be met by an ap-
propriate reconstrual of intensional isomorphism. 
Probably22 the other two most detailed responses to 
Mates have come from Church and Seilars. In Sellars' 
case, 2 3 the response to Mates amounts to the claim that 
one must distinguish two different uses of expressions 
in oblique belief contexts: (i) a pure using sense, and 
(ii) an autonomous self-referential use. That is, 
there is a distinction between the occurance of 
•Gr(v,III)' in 'John believes that whoever believes 
that 5>3 believes that Gr(v,III)' and the occurance of 
'Gr(v,III)' in "The sentence 'whoever believes that 5>3 
belives that Gr(v,lII}' expresses something John 
believes" since, in this latter occurance, 'Gr(v,III)' 
is part of a sentence which is to be understood as John 
uses it. Sellars' point is that Mates' counterexamples 
turn on a systematic confusion of these two contexts. 
As Bürge notes, however: 
The trouble with Sellars' rebuttal to Mates' ar-
gument is that it is too pat. IThe one be-
lieving) may not have any particular counter-
example to the substitution in mind. His doubt 
may be the result of a perfectly general caution 
about substitution in belief contexts.24 
In addition, it is not intuitively obvious that Mates' 
counterexamples apply only to direct-discourse occuran-
ces of D and D'. In Church's case, 2 s Mates' counter-
examples are met by (in contrast to Putnam) strengthen-
ing Carnap's intensional isomorphism to synonymous 
isomorphism. That is, the condition of L-equivalence, 
necessary for isomorphism, is replaced by synonymy. 
However, as both Schettler2" and Bürge point out, there 
is reason to believe that this attempted answer to 
Mates' problem is, like Sellars' insufficient. 
Moreover, the problems with synonymy that arose in con-
nection with (ER)"' would, ostensibly, arise here. 
That is, what does it mean to say that the two 
singular-terms are synonymous? 
Although it may begin to appear as if the search 
for an adequate specification of R is like the search 
for the Holy Grail, there are still alternatives not 
yet considered. We can, for instance, follow the lead 
of philosophers such as Hintikka and suppose that the 
proper specification for (ER) depends upon the ap-
propriate adoption of a possible world semantics/ontol-
ogy. Concerning this, Hintikka says: 
My basic assumption (slightly oversimplified) is 
that an attribution of any propositional attitude 
to the person in question involves a division of 
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all the possible worlds (more precisely, all the 
possible worlds which we can distinguish in the 
part of the language we use in making the at-
tribution) into two classes: into those possible 
worlds which are [doxastically] in accordance 
with the attitude in question and into those 
which are |doxastically] incompatible with it. 2 7 
This means that any sentence of the form r a believes 
that p"1 must be translated into rin all possible worlds 
[doxastically] compatible with what a believes, it is 
the case that p n. The ramifications of this move are 
many: not only must (ER) be appropriately modified by 
an explicit reference to possible worlds, but in addi-
tion, the notion of what it means to be a singular term 
must be nailed down. In particular, since belief is 
relativized to possible worlds, the referent of any 
genuine singular term about which there is some belief 
(e.g., John in 2.") cannot simply be some individual 
object in the actual world. Rather, Hintikka (and 
other possible world theorists) must, in some sense, 
distinguish actual from possible (albeit real) objects. 
The point is that while two singular terms 'a' and 'b' 
may, from the point of view of possible world seman-
tics, refer to the same individual in the actual world 
(i.e., <1> (a, | j 0 )=<Mb,u0 ) where | i 0 denotes/designates the actual world), it is nonetheless possible that in some 
possible world | i t , 'a' and 'b' refer to different in-dividuals (i.e., 4>(a,u, )=4>(b,|ij)). This "refinement" 
is reflected in Hintikka's definition of what it means 
to say that an instance of ra believes that p"1 is 
true, viz.: 
ra believes that p"1 is true in a possible world 
| i Q if and only if p is true in every member of 
<t>o(a,|i), where $ R (a,u) is the set of all possi-ble worlds doxastically compatible with a's 
belief, and (j>R is the two-argument function of referentially opaque belief.28 
The upshot is that Hintikka, by strengthening the con-
ditions under which two singular referring expressions 
are truly identical, has undercut the entailment of 3." 
from 1." and 2." by showing 1." (with 'Eq.' recon-
strued along Hintikka's lines) to be false. In order 
for the inference from 1." and 2." to 3." to work, 1." 
would have to have been: 
1."" In all possible worlds, it is the case that 
the referent of 'John' is the same as the 
referent of 'the butler'. For all |i c 0, 
4» ('John', |i) = <M'the butler', u ). 
Now it may be that the adoption of a possible world 
semantics (though perhaps not Hintikka's2J) really does 
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"save" (ET). Certainly W. I.ycan, who holds a view of 
possible worlds similar to Plantinga, thinks it does. 
Lycan says: 
By positing nonactual worlds as states of af-
fairs, we may achieve our familiar but still re-
markable reduction of alethic modalities to quan-
tifiers, formulate Tarski-style semantics for 
propositional attitudes and hosts of other trou-
blesome constructions,...30 
But even if the adoption of a possible world semantics 
does insure the universality of(ET)'s application (and 
I am inclined to think it does), it is only at a cer-
tain cost. For instance, if one's conception of pos-
sible worlds is like David Lewis', then possible worlds 
are viewed as "...respectible entities in their own 
right."31 This means that accepting Lewis' view of 
possible worlds requires that a certain amount of 
"ontological baggage" (Lewis' "Ontological Slum" in 
Haack's words 3 2) must also be countenanced in exchange 
for "saving" (ET). If, in contrast to Lewis, one 
thinks of possible worlds along the lines of Kripke, 
i.e., as purely formal mathematical model structures, 
then while one need not, perhaps, worry about any 
"extra" ontological entities, there are still certain 
metaphysical assumptions that one seems forced to 
accept. Specifically, essentialism seems to unavoid-
ably follow from Kripke's definition of a quantifica-
tional model requiring individuals being identifiable 
across possible worlds.*3 Thus, the one reformulation 
of (ER) which seems to offer the promise of a solution 
to the problem of propositional attitude contexts 
requires either a considerable widening of one's on-
tology, or an acceptance of metaphysical "doctrines" 
such as essentialism, or both. This suggests that 
there is a (perhaps not so subtle) dependency of the 
applicability ot (ET) on prior metaphysical and on-
tological commitments. 
But now let us pause. What I have tried to make 
clear in the above is that even those logics tra-
ditionally called intensional, Frege's and Hintikka's 
tensionalism. Indeed, It seems clear that if an inten-
sional logic is supposed to differ from an extensional 
logic, ostensibly by either denying (ET) or offering 
some alternative to (ET), then so-called intensional 
logics such as Frege's and Hintikka*s are simply not 
intensional at all. 3 4 This differs from Marcus' view 
that "A language is explicitly intensional to the de-
gree to which it does not equate the identity relation 
with some weaker form of equivalence."38 The whole 
point is that the equivalence relation simpliciter, 
Eq., is uninterpreted. Are we, for instance, In-
terested in equivalence qua sameness of reference in 
for example, are just attempts to save ex-
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the actual world or in equivalence qua something else. 
It seems to me that, in contrast to the traditional 
view which claims that a context is intensional just in 
case the salva veritate substitutibility of co-refering 
expressions does noF~universally hold, 3 6 a better way 
to view the extensional/intensional distinction is to 
adopt Marcus' own view that extensionality comes in 
degrees. In this case, a (traditionally) intensional 
language is simply a more restrictive (with regards to 
the specification of R) extensional language. 
This suggests, I think, that the impetus for a-
dopting a possible world semantics lies with the demand 
that (ET)'s applicability be universal. However, the 
unwillingness of many to countenance any talk of possi-
ble worlds raises an important question which, up to 
this point, has been lurking in the background, viz., 
"Why should we feel obligated to continue to attempt to 
patch up (ET) in such a way that (ET) should retain its 
universal applicability for the language of the lan-
guage user?". In other words, why not simply stop with 
the original specification of (ER) and say that (ET)'s 
applicability does not range over the entire language 
but simply over some well-defined portion of it? In a 
way this seems to be precisely what Quine does in Word 
and Object. Here Quine is apparantly unwilling to 
countenance either the individuals (e.g., intensions) 
or the metaphysics necessary to save the universal ap-
plicability of (ET) and so simply restricts its ap-
plicability. Indeed, this seems to be precisely the 
position of Quine's that Marcus had in mind when she 
says that in Quine's view, propositional attitude con-
texts are "consigned to a shelf labeled 'referential 
opacity'...and are disposed of." 3 7 Of course this does 
not really settle the issue. How we are to decide upon 
the range of (ET)'s applicability lies, afterall, in an 
answer to the question "Which is most important, onto-
logical/metaphysical austerity or universal applic-
ability of (ET)?" To answer this, however, presupposes 
that we understand the motivation for holding (ET) 
(whatever the limits of its applicability) in the first 
place. Accordingly, it is to this issue that I at last 
turn. 
The suggestion of this paper is that the reason 
there lias been such a reluctance to either limit the 
applicability of (ET) or reject it entirely rests with 
the crucial role it is deemed to play in any attempt to 
provide a theory of meaning. Now by a theory of mean-
ing I mean, at the very least, a theory which will, in 
some appropriate sense, do two jobs: first, it will 
"give the meaning" of each sentence (of the object 
language), and second, it will give an account of how 
the meanings of the sentences (of the object language) 
depend upon the meanings of the words that compose 
them.38 In the simplest case, what the first reguire-
ment on a theory of meaning amounts to is that any ade-
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quate theory of meaning must generate (i.e., entail) an 
instance of the schema 
(M) r s means that p*1 
for each sentence in the object language. Given this 
as a response to the first demand of a theory of mean-
ing, what now of the second? For reasons given by 
Davidson,39 the appeal to meanings of sentences (as en-
tities, e.g. Facts) is of no help in solving the second 
of the dual tasks required of a theory of meaning. 
Hence, 'p', as it occurs in the M-schema, cannot be 
replaced by the name of some entity/thing. According-
ly, Davidson suggests that the natural move to make is 
to imagine 'p 1, in (M), replaced by a sentence (in the 
metalanguage). Since sentences prefixed with 'that' 
don't name facts, (unless we choose to allow them to), 
the problem now changes and becomes that of under-
standing precisely how the (apparantly intensional) 
'means that', as it occurs in (M), is to be construed 
so as to allow the second requirement of a theory of 
meaning to be met. 
If we look backwards in the history of philosophy 
to Wittgenstein (of the Tractatus), we find the view 
expressed that 'means that' means something like 'ex-
presses agreement and disagreement with the possibi-
lities of combinations of the existence and non-
existence of atomic facts'. This rather long winded 
explanation, however, simply means that it is the truth 
conditions of a sentence we are asking for when we ask 
for its meaning. Thus, to say in the Wittgensteinian 
vernacular that a sentence S has a particular meaning 
is to say that the sentence S referentially pictures a 
particular combination of the existence and non-exist-
ence of the elements of some subset of the set of all 
atomic facts. But in this case, any two sentences, S, 
and §2 have identical meaning just in case they refer-
entially picture the same particular combination of the 
existence and non-existence of the elements of some 
subset of the set of all atomic facts. Putting the 
point differently, if St referentially pictures\a., 
a 2 i • • • a n / where (a (, a2,...a } is a subset of all atomic facts, then the sentence S 2 means S, if and only if S;j also referentially pictures <[a,, a2,...a /. As suggested above, however, this amounts to the claim 
that S, has the same meaning as S 2 if and only if the truth-conditions of S| are the same as the truth-
conditions of S 2 . It is important to notice here that we already have an implicit acceptance of (ET) operat-
ing in the theory of meaning. In particular, by saying 
that S| means S 2 just in case they referentially pic-ture a particular combination of the existence and non-
existence of the elements of the same subset of the set 
of all atomic facts, one is implicitly saying that if 
both S, is a sentential component of some larger 
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(molecular) sentence SENT and S| means S 2, then substi-tution of s 2 for S, in SENT will not alter the meaning of SENT. After all, SENT will change meaning only if 
it referentially pictures a different combination of 
the existence and non-existence of the elements of some 
subset of the set of all atomic facts. The substi-
tution of S 2 for §! in SENT, however, cannot cause any alteration in SENT's referential picturing since the 
particular combination of the existence and non-
existence of the elements of some subset of the set of 
all atomic facts is precisely the same for both Sj and 
S 2. Wittgenstein, however, goes further with His an-alysis and claims both that corresponding to every 
atomic fact there is an atomic proposition (an atomic 
sentence if you will) which pictures it and every 
(meaningful) atomic proposition pictures an atomic 
fact. Hence, if the sentence S| is a molecular sen-
tence, then the manner in which" one determines what the 
truth-conditions of that sentence are is by uncovering 
its deep logical form; i.e., by determining both the 
constituent atomic propositions of S| and their rel-
ative order. Accordingly, if the sentences that make 
up SENT are themselves both meaningful and molecular, 
then they must, in principle, be able to be broken down 
into their constituent sentences. Indeed the process 
only stops when the analysis encounters nothing but 
atomic sentences. Hence, SENT is nothing but a partic-
ular ordering of atomic sentences. This accords with 
Dummett's claim that a theory of meaning requires a 
molecular (in his sense, not Wittgenstein's) conception 
of language.40 Moreover, there is a curious sort of 
parallel between this view and the methodology Davidson 
employs in coming to understand (interpret) another 
language. For instance, Davidson says: 
The process of devising a theory of truth for an 
unknown native tongue might in crude outline go 
as follows. First we look for the best way to 
fit our logic, to the extent required to get a 
theory satisfying Convention-T onto the language; 
this means reading the logical vocabulary of 
first order quantification theory (plus identity) 
into the language, not taking the logical con-
straints one by one, but treating this much of 
logic as a grid to be fitted onto the language in 
one fell swoop.41 
Davidson's point is that a theory of meaning for a 
language presupposes that the language either has a 
readily observable logical structure or else must have 
one read into it. But why, we may ask, is this nec-
essary? The answer seems to be that Davidson believes 
that it is by using a Tarski-type truth definition that 
one supplies a theory of meaning for sentences of the 
language. A Tarski-type truth definition is, however, 
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a definition which defines the truth of sentences by 
specifying the sentence's truth-conditions. Hence, 
Davidson's holism notwithstanding, the theory of mean-
ing advocated by Davidson appears to be a sophisticated 
variant of a Wittgensteinian theory wherein the meaning 
of a sentence is given when the truth-conditions of 
that sentence, and all sentences built-up from it or 
its open-sentence equivalent, are given. In addition, 
for Tarski the truth-conditions of a sentence ultim-
ately depend upon the notion of satisfaction, and, when 
satisfaction is used to provide a theory of meaning (as 
opposed to just a definition of truth as in Tarski), 
the satisfaction relation is a (realistic) corres-
pondence relation.42 In other words, the meaning of a 
non-atomic sentence is a function of both the sat-
isfaction conditions of its atomic constituents and the 
(logical) order of its atomic constituents. But this 
means that the Davidsonian theory of meaning rests upon 
the same basic assumptions that Wittgenstein's theory 
did. In addition, it should be clear that both the-
ories defend (CT) just because of their reliance upon 
the correspondance theory which grounds the truth-
conditions and which, in turn, are utilized by both in 
constructing a theory of meaning. 
To return to the view of Wittgenstein, which shows 
so well the presuppositions of more contemporary the-
ories of meaning, we can formulate the following prede-
cessor of (ET): 
(ET)* If 'S|' and 'Pt% are both atomic proposi-
tions and 'S|' and 'Pi' both referentially 
picture ^a|, a2,...a /, then if 'F(S|)' is true, then 'F(Pi)* is true. 
As suggested above, the upshot of (ET)* is that the 
definition of the meaning of a sentence as its truth-
conditions demands that (ET) hold. But now suppose, 
paralleling the original problem with 2." and 3.", that 
'F(S|)' is true and 'F(Pi)' is false. If it is granted 
that this situation could occur, then clearly *F(S|)' 
cannot mean the same thing as 'F(Pi)' since meaning is 
defined as identity of truth-conditions. But what has 
failed? It seems, as was pointed out in the discussion 
of (ET), that the only answer is that it is the specif-
ications of r.. .meaning the same as..."' as 
•"...picturing the same state-of-affairs as...n which 
has failed. 
This failure notwithstanding, it seems that the 
general conception that the second requirement of an 
adequate theory of meaning can be met by an appeal to 
truth-conditions has been so pervasive that nearly ev-
eryone in philosophy of language has either explicitly 
(e.g., Davidson, Quine) or implicitly (e.g., Hintikka) 
adopted it. What I have tried to suggest, though, is 
that by its very nature, anyone who seriously adopts 
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such a presupposition about a theory of meaning is in-
evitably led to adopt (ET) as well. Hence, to give up 
the universality of (ET) for a language is tantamount, 
on this view, to giving up the guest for providing a 
single theory of meaning for that language. It may be, 
however, that it is not to give up the search for a 
theory of meaning for some proper subset of the set oT 
sentences of a language. What I have in mind is a 
variation of Quine's view concerning the possibility of 
alternate translation manuals for a language; the sug-
gestion being that a translation manual using (ET) 
might be appropriate for some limited portion of a lan-
guage, but inappropriate for another. 
In the final analysis, of course, it should be 
recognized that the theory of meaning Wittgenstein so 
well epitomizes rests upon a particular view concerning 
the relation of the world and language. While there is 
a temptation to see (only) the correspondance theory of 
truth behind the adoption of (ET), one must also ask 
why one would, in the first place, adopt a correspon-
dance theory. A possible answer to this is that it is 
the acceptance of a realist metaphysics/ontology which 
motivates the acceptance of a correspondance theory. 
In other words, it seems that, at the deepest level, it 
is an acceptance of a realist metaphysics which leads 
to the adoption of (ET). Indeed, this seems to accord 
well with the anti-realist's reluctance to grant (ET) 
universal applicability. That is, while (ET) may hold 
for that set of sentences which are either true or 
false, it does not hold for that set of sentences which 
are neither true nor false.'13 Hence, questions about 
the applicability of (ET) are, perhaps, best deferred 
until the knotty metaphysical/ontological problems of 
realism are dealt with. 
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